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RECENT DECISIONS
Some authorities have felt that the result of these decisions will be
a serious impairment of police effectiveness to solve crimes which could
have been solved with a few hours of police interrogation.2 Those
who argue in support of the Court's position feel that the sacrifice in
police efficiency is a necessary evil which must be endured if individual
freedom and liberty are to be protected against police tyranny. 9 It
would seem desirable that a complete clarification of the law be forth-
coming from the Court so that there would be a definite uniform stand-
ard which could be followed throughout the states.
AARON TWERSKI
Trade Regulations: The Applicability of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act to Bank Mergers-In United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank,' the Supreme Court held, in a case of first impression, that section
7 of the Clayton Act is applicable to bank mergers. The Philadelphia
National Bank and the Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank, the second
and third largest commercial banks with main offices in the metropolitan
area of Philadelphia, sought to merge into one consolidated bank. If
such a merger had succeeded, the resulting bank would have been the
largest in the immediate Philadelphia area. However, as soon as the
banks had secured approval of such merger from the Comptroller of
the Currency,2 the government brought suit under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act.4 The Court then enjoined
the proposed merger agreement, holding that section 7 of the Clayton
Act applied to bank mergers, and that the anti-competitive effects of
the proposed merger violated its provisions.5
2ssymposium--Law and Police Practice; Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of
Interrogation and Confessions, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 77 (1957). Professor
Inbau also criticizes the Court for usurping a function which does not be-
long to them-that of passing over proper police practices. That in truth, this
is what the Court is doing can be seen from the majority decision in the
Haynes case where Mr. Justice Goldberg said that the Court was passing on
proper and permissable police tactics.
29 Symposion-Law and Police Practice; Liebowitz, Safeguards in the Law of
Interrogation and Confession, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 86 (1957).
'-U.S.-, 83 Sup. Ct. 1715 (1963).
2The Comptroller's approval of such agreement is required under 73 STAT.
462 (1959), 12 U.S.C. §215 (Supp. 1963). Such approval in turn may not be
given under the BANK MERGER Acr of 1960, 74 STAT. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C.
1828(C) (Supp. 1960), until the Comptroller has received reports from the
Attorney General, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, on the probable effects of
the proposed transaction on competition.226 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §1 (Supp. 1960).
438 STAT. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §18 (1958).
5 The Sherman Act issue was never reached in this case, due to the fact that
the majority based its decision on §7 of the Clayton Act. It should be noted,
however, that in dicta the Court considered §1 of the Sherman Act to be
applicable to bank mergers, and that Justice Goldberg, in his dissent, felt
that there was a strong Sherman Act issue in the case. See Note, 75 HARV.
L Rnv. 757, 759 (1962) for a discussion of this question.
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In reaching its decision, the Court was faced first with the question
of whether the consolidation or merger came within the language of
section 7 of the Clayton Act." Literally, section 7 reaches "stock and
share capital" acquisitions, as well as "asset" acquisitions made by cor-
porations "subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion." The Court noted that a merger did not fit neatly under any of
these terms and deemed it necessary to look at the Congressional de-
sign and history behind section 7, in order to determine the proper
status of a merger thereunder."
In doing this, the court referred to the fact that prior to the amend-
ment of section 7 in 1950, the courts had found mergers to be beyond
the act's reach. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, went on to
say that with this background in mind in 1950, Congress amended sec-
tion 7 to include an asset acquisition provision. On these premises and
by deductive reasoning, which somewhat stretches the imagination, the
Court then concluded that even though the 1950 amendment did not
expressly refer to mergers, Congress intended to close the merger loop-
hole of the act by this amendment. The Court stated that:
. . . the stock-acquisition and asset acquisition-provisions, read
together, reach mergers which fit neither category perfectly but
lie somewhere between the two ends of the spectrum ... .
The Court also noted that:
So construed, the specific exception for acquiring corporations
not subject to the F.T.C.'s jurisdiction excludes from the cover-
age of §7 only asset acquisitions when not accomplished by
merger.9
Having held that section 7 of the Clayton Act was applicable to
mergers, the Court turned to the problem of determining if "in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such ac-
quisition may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly." The Court found that the cluster of products (various
kinds of credit) and services (such as checking accounts and trust ad-
ministration) denoted by the term "commercial banking" composed a
6 Note 4 supra. The act reads as follows:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of an-
other corporation engaged also in commerce where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a mono-
poly ....
7 It is interesting to note that if the Court had found that the proposed agree-
ment was a pure asset acquisition, §7 would have been inapplicable. The rea-
son for this is due to the fact that the F.T.C. has no jurisdiction over banks.
F.T.C. AcT, §5, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(6) (1958).
8 Note 1 supra, at 1730.
9 Ibid.
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distinct line of commerce, that the four-county area in which the banks'
offices were located was the section of the country within which the
proposed merger's competitive effect should be considered, and that the
merger of the two banks would result in a single bank controlling at
least 30% of the commercial banking business in the relevant area,
which might substantially lessen competition. The Court concluded that
the defendant banks had offered no satisfactory evidence to rebut these
findings and that, therefore, the proposed agreement should not be
allowed.
The Philadelphia National Bank decision will justly incur much
concern and criticism in and by the banking world.10 The remainder of
this article will be devoted to two particular portions of the Court's
opinion which merit disfavor: the Court's ineptly-reasoned determina-
tion that Congress intended in 1950 to include bank mergers within the
purview of section 7 of the Clayton Act, and the lack of clarity by the
Court in defining just what it will consider to be an enjoinable merger
in the future.
As has already been indicated, the Court, in holding that bank
mergers were subject to section 7, laid great stress on the fact that
prior to its 1950 amendment, section 7, by judicial fiat, had been held
not to apply to such mergers. The main basis of the Court's rationale
was that if a liberal construction were not given to section 7, it would
still contain a merger loophole, placing industries, such as banking, at
least partially beyond the scope of the anti-trust laws. This, the majority
felt, was not the Legislature's intention, or else Congress would have
exempted banking from the stock acquisition as well as the asset-
acquisition provision of section 7.'11
While the majority's somewhat negative approach is not wholly de-
void of logic, it does not stand up well when viewed in light of our
federal law-makers' positive and explicit handling of commercial bank-
ing. Presently, this field is governed by a number of highly specialized
agencies and individuals, all created or empowered by act of Congress. 2
They include the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
10 One of the first persons to criticize the Court's decision has been Senator A.
Willis Robertson, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Com-
mittee. A day after the Court rendered its decision he stated:
I was shocked to hear of the Supreme Court's decision in the
Philadelphia bank merger case. This is one of the most incredible
cases of judicial legislation which the Court has handed down.
I was shocked both at the result-and at the Court's casual disregard
for Congressional intent and purpose.
Report To The Members of the Banking Committee (June 21, 1963).
11 It should be noted that under such rationale, the Court might now hold that
acquisitions (similar to the one in the present case) by "common" and "air
carriers," also come within the purview of §7. "Common" and "air carriers,"
like "banks," are not subject to the jurisdiction of the F.T.C., supra note 7.
12 See Klebaner, Federal Control of Commercial Bank Mergers, 37 IND.
L. J. 287 (1962) and Comment, Bank Charter, Branching, Holding Company
and Merger Laws: Competition Frustrated, 71 YALE L. J. 502 (1962).
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tem,' 3 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 14 and the Comp-
troller of the Currency.' 5 Surely, Congress must have been cognizant
of these specialists when it amended section 7 in 1950, as well as in
later years, when it rejected bills especially designed to include bank
mergers within section 7.16 If Congress felt that these agencies and in-
dividuals were inadequate, or that commercial bank mergers should be
governed by the less capable hands of the Justice Department and the
courts, then why didn't it amend section 7 to include bank mergers as
was proposed?
Congress also empowered these agencies and individuals in 1960 to
govern bank mergers, under the Bank Merger Act. With such an ex-
plicit grant of authority, it is difficult to see how the Court could decide
as it has, for why should Congress create this act if it felt that such
transactions were already governed by section 7? The fact of the matter
is that the Philadelphia National Bank case has undone much of the
work of Congress by taking away a substantial portion of the power it
had given its specialized agencies and agents under the Bank Merger
Act and placing it in the hands of the courts and Justice Department.
As a result, these administrators are presently left with little more
than an initial veto power under the Act. Now, if the courts see fit, a
bank merger, approved under the Bank Merger Act, may still be pre-
vented or delayed by the courts at the insistence of the Justice Depart-
ment. Thus, the banker is left in the unenviable position of not being
able to rely on the fact that his proposed business transactions have been
approved by federal agencies, which approval the law requires him to
secure.'
7
As Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissent, even the Justice De-
partment, seven years after section 7 was amended, maintained that
asset acquisitions by banks were not covered by section 7.1 Harlan
goes on to state that the 1950 amendment was aimed at ordinary com-
mercial 9 and industrial" fields rather than at the specialized field of
banking:
1349 STAT. 705 (1935), 12 U.S.C. §263 (1942).
1464 STAT. 873 (1950), 12 U.S.C. §§1815, 1816 (1950).
15 Note 2 supra.
16H. R. REP. No. 5948, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); S. REP. No. 198, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. REP. No. 722, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
'T Under the Bank Merger Act of 1960, the Justice Department could merely
render an advisory opinion on the anticompetitive effects of the proposed
merger, which could be disregarded by the Comptroller of the Currency in
making his final decision. Now, an unfavorable opinion by the Justice De-
partment, in effect, has almost the force of law.
Is Note 1 supra, at 1749. Citing, Hearings on the Financial Institutions Act of
1957 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Commnittee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1030 (1957).
'9 Note 1 supra, at 1757. Citing, among others, Hearings on H.R. 2737 before
a Subcommittee of the Senate Comnittee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st
and 2d Sess., 5-6, 17, 57-59 (1950).
20Id. citing, S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950); H. R. REP. No.
1191, 81st Cong., Sess. 2-3 (1949).
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.. . the absence of any banks in the legislative history of the
1950 amendment, viewed in light of the prior congressional treat-
ment of banking as a distinctive area with specialized character-
istics and needs, compels the conclusion that bank mergers were
simply not then regarded as part of the loophole to be plugged.2 '
Therefore, it is evident that the majority's "loophole plugging" phil-
osophy is certainly not founded on a strong basis of congressional in-
tent. Congress has expressly evinced its desires to the contrary. It has
seen fit to treat commercial banking as a specialized industry, and has
rejected proposals to place such industry within the confines of sec-
tion 7.
Perhaps the greatest problem created by the Philadelphia National
Bank case, however, is due to what the Court did not say. The Court
stated that bank asset acquisitions, completed in a manner other than
by merger, are still not within the scope of section 7, but vaguely de-
fined just what it will now consider to be an enjoinable merger.
The Court did say that an agreement (such as the one in issue) in-
volving the creation of "an entity different from either of the con-
stituent banks," though technically a consolidation, would be considered
a merger for purposes of section 7.22 A consolidation is distinguished
from a merger as follows:
A consolidation is the dissolution of the corporation previously
existing, and at the same instant the creation of a new corpora-
tion, with property, liabilities, and stockholders derived from those
passing out of existence. It is, in effect, the surrender of the old
charters. [PNB's was not so surrendered] the acceptance there-
of by the Legislature, and the formation of a new company out
of such portions of the old as enter into the new.
On a consolidation of the two corporations, a new corporation
comes into being, while by a merger one is continued and another
is merely merged into it.23
Thus, in effect, both bank consolidations and mergers are now subject
to section 7 of the Clayton Act.
As to what other types of agreements the courts may strike down,
however, it is far from certain. The Court defined what it would, hence-
forth, consider to be a merger as any "clearly evasive transaction ...
tantamount in its effects to a merger.' 424 (Emphasis added.) To arrive
at an exact meaning of such words is no easy task.
An example of a transaction which does not fall within the Court's
literal definition of a merger or a consolidation is the acquisition of a
portion of another bank's assets or liabilities to pay deposits, wherein
there is a dissolution of neither bank nor the creation of a new entity.
21 Note 1 supra, at 1758.
22 Note 1 sepra, at 1724 n.7.
23 1 ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING, §151, at 103 (rev. ed. 1936).
24 Note 22 supra.
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Such a transaction is distinguished from a merger or a consolidation
under the terms of the Bank Merger Act.2 - But while the Court speaks
of this type of transaction, its language does little to clear up its status.
This and other possible agreements, therefore, must await definition
through further litigation, at the expense of the banking industry.
In summary, the Philadelphia National Bank case places bank merg-
ers within the confines of section 7 of the Clayton Act. To reach such a
conclusion, the Supreme Court has read the history of the Clayton Act
much more with an end in sight than with the proper means of get-
ting there. As to what type of transaction will be considered an enjoin-
able merger in the future is, as yet, uncertain. There is one result of this
case which is apparent, however, that being its future unpopularity with
the commercial banking world.
JAMES B. YOUNG
25 Note 2 supra.
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